Iran’s unprecedented strikes on Israel this weekend have shaken Israel’s assumptions about its foe, undermining its long-held calculation that Iran would be best deterred by greater Israeli aggression.
伊朗在刚过去的这个周末对以色列发动了史无前例的打击，这动摇了以色列对敌人的假设，也动摇了以色列一直以来的推定：吓阻伊朗的最佳方式就是以色列更凶悍。

For years, Israeli officials have argued, both in public and in private, that the harder Iran is hit, the warier it will be about fighting back. Iran’s barrage of more than 300 drones and missiles on Saturday — the first direct attack by Iran on Israel — has overturned that logic.
多年来，以色列官员无论是在公开场合还是私下里都认为，伊朗受到的打击越大，它就越不敢反击。伊朗周六发射的300多架无人机和导弹推翻了这一逻辑，这是伊朗对以色列发动的首次直接攻击。

The attack was a response to Israel’s strike earlier this month in Syria that killed seven Iranian military officials there. Analysts said it showed that leaders in Tehran are no longer content with battling Israel through their various proxies, like Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen, but instead are prepared to take on Israel directly.
这次袭击是对以色列本月早些时候在叙利亚发动的一次袭击的回应，那次袭击造成七名伊朗军官死亡。分析人士表示，这表明德黑兰领导人不再满足于通过各种代理人与以色列作战，如黎巴嫩真主党或也门胡塞武装，而是准备直接跟以色列叫板。

“I think we miscalculated,” said Sima Shine, a former head of research for the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency.
“我认为我们打错了算盘，”以色列对外情报机构摩萨德前研究主管西玛·夏因说。

“The accumulated experience of Israel is that Iran doesn’t have good means to retaliate,” Ms. Shine added. “There was a strong feeling that they don’t want to be involved in the war.”
“以色列积累的经验是，伊朗没有好的报复手段，”夏因补充说。“之前以色列有一种强烈的感觉，那就是伊朗不想卷入战争。”

Instead, Iran has created “a completely new paradigm,” Ms. Shine said.
相反，伊朗创造了“一种全新的范式”，夏因说道。

Iran’s response ultimately caused little damage in Israel, in large part because Iran had telegraphed its intentions well in advance, giving Israel and its allies several days to prepare a strong defense. Iran also released a statement, even before the attack was over, that it had no further plans to strike Israel.
伊朗的回应最终对以色列几乎没有造成什么损害，这在很大程度上是因为伊朗提前发出了信号，给了以色列及其盟友数天时间来准备强有力的防御。甚至在袭击结束前，伊朗还发表了一份声明，称自己没有进一步打击以色列的计划。

Nevertheless, Iran’s strikes turn a yearslong shadow war between Israel and Iran into a direct confrontation — albeit one that could yet be contained, depending on how Israel responds. Iran has demonstrated that it has considerable firepower that can only be rebuffed with intensive support from Israel’s allies, like the United States, underscoring how much damage it could potentially inflict without such protection.
然而，伊朗的袭击将以色列和伊朗之间多年来的影子战争变成了直接对抗，尽管这种对抗仍有可能被遏制——取决于以色列的回应。伊朗已经表明自己拥有强大的火力，只有在美国等以色列盟友的大力支持下才能抵挡住它的攻击，这也凸显了如果没有这种保护，它可能会造成多大的破坏。

Iran and Israel once had a more ambiguous relationship, with Israel even selling arms to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. But their ties later frayed after that war ended; Iranian leaders became increasingly critical of Israel’s approach to the Palestinians, and Israel grew wary of Iran’s efforts to build a nuclear program and its increased support for Hezbollah.
伊朗和以色列的关系曾经比较暧昧，在上世纪80年代的两伊战争期间，以色列甚至向伊朗出售过武器。但在战争结束后，双方的关系出现了裂痕。以色列对待巴勒斯坦人的方式引来伊朗越来越严厉的斥责，而以色列对伊朗核军备努力及其对真主党的支持越来越持警惕态度。

For more than a decade, both countries have quietly targeted each other’s interests across the region, while rarely announcing any individual action.
十多年来，两国一直在悄悄地瞄准对方在该地区的利益，却很少公开宣布任何具体行动。

Iran has supported Hamas and financed and armed other regional militias hostile to Israel, several of which have been engaged in a low-level conflict with Israel since the deadly attacks by Hamas on Oct. 7. Similarly, Israel has regularly targeted those proxies, as well as assassinated Iranian officials, including on Iranian soil, killings for which it avoids taking formal responsibility.
伊朗一直支持哈马斯，并为其他敌视以色列的地区民兵组织提供资金和武器。自10月7日哈马斯发动致命袭击以来，其中几个民兵组织与以色列发生了一场低级别冲突。同样，以色列也经常以这些代理人为目标，并暗杀伊朗官员，包括在伊朗境内，但它会避免对这些杀戮事件承担正式责任。

Both countries have targeted merchant ships with links to their opponents, as well as carried out cyberattacks on one another, and Israel has repeatedly sabotaged Iran’s nuclear program.
两国都瞄准了与对方有联系的商船，并对彼此发起网络攻击，以色列还多次破坏伊朗的核计划。

Now, that war is out in the open. And in large part, it is because of what some analysts see as an Israeli miscalculation on April 1, when Israeli strikes destroyed part of an Iranian embassy complex in Damascus, Syria, one of Iran’s closest allies and proxies, killing the seven Iranian military officials, including three top commanders.
现在，战争公开化了。一些分析人士认为，这在很大程度上这是因为以色列在4月1日的误判，当时以色列摧毁了在叙利亚大马士革的伊朗大使馆的部分建筑，造成七名伊朗军人死亡，包括三名高级指挥官。叙利亚是伊朗最亲密的盟友和代理人之一。

The attack followed repeated suggestions from Israeli leaders that greater pressure on Iran would encourage Tehran to scale back its ambitions across the Middle East. “An increase in the pressure placed on Iran is critical,” Yoav Gallant, Israel’s defense minister, said in January, “and may prevent regional escalation in additional arenas.”
在这次袭击之前，以色列领导人曾多次表示，对伊朗施加更大的压力将促使德黑兰降低在中东地区的野心。以色列国防部长约亚夫·加兰特在今年1月表示：“加大对伊朗的压力至关重要，可能会防止地区局势在其他领域的升级。”

Instead, the Damascus attack led directly to the first Iranian assault on Israeli sovereign territory.
然而，对大马士革的袭击直接导致了伊朗对以色列主权领土的首次打击。

Israel may have misunderstood Iran’s position because of the lack of Iranian response to earlier Israeli assassinations of senior Iranian officials, analysts said.
分析人士说，以色列可能误解了伊朗的立场，因为伊朗对早些时候以色列暗杀伊朗高级官员没有作出回应。

Though Israeli leaders have long feared that Iran will one day build and fire nuclear missiles at Israel, they had grown used to targeting Iranian officials without direct retaliation from Tehran.
尽管以色列领导人长期以来一直担心伊朗有一天会制造并向以色列发射核导弹，但他们已经习惯了将伊朗官员为目标，并不会受到德黑兰的直接报复。

In one of the most brazen attacks, Israel killed Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, in 2020 on Iranian soil. As recently as December, Israel was accused of killing a top Iranian general, Sayyed Razi Mousavi, in a strike in Syria, where Iranian military officials advise and support the Syrian government. Those and several other assassinations did not prompt retaliatory Iranian strikes on Israel.
2020年，以色列在伊朗领土上杀死了伊朗顶级核科学家莫赫森·法赫里扎德，这是最大胆的袭击之一。就在去年12月，以色列被指控在对叙利亚的空袭中杀死了伊朗高级将领赛义德·拉齐·穆萨维——伊朗军方官员在那里为叙利亚政府提供建议和支持。这些暗杀和其他几起暗杀并没有促使伊朗对以色列进行报复性打击。

Iran’s decision to respond this time was partly prompted by the fury in some circles of Iranian society at Iran’s previous passivity, according to Ali Vaez, an Iran analyst.
伊朗问题分析人士阿里·瓦伊兹表示，伊朗这次决定做出回应，部分原因是伊朗社会中的一些群体对伊朗此前的被动感到愤怒。

“The degree of bottom-up pressure that I saw on the regime over the past 10 days, I’ve never seen before,” said Mr. Vaez, an analyst at the International Crisis Group, a research group based in Brussels.
“过去10天里，我看到这个政权自下而上的压力之大，是我以前从未见过的，”总部位于布鲁塞尔的研究机构国际危机组织的分析师瓦伊兹说。

Iran also needed to show proxies like Hezbollah that it could stand up for itself, Mr. Vaez added. “To demonstrate that Iran is too afraid to retaliate against such a brazen attack on its own diplomatic facility in Damascus would have been very damaging for Iran’s relations and the credibility of the Iranians in the eyes of their regional partners,” he said.
瓦伊兹还说，伊朗还需要向真主党等代理人表明，伊朗可以捍卫自己。“伊朗在大马士革的外交设施遭到如此公然的袭击，如果还表现出不敢报复，这将对该国的关系，以及它在地区伙伴眼中的信誉造成极大损害，”他说。

For some analysts, Israel’s strike on Damascus may yet prove to have been a smaller miscalculation than it first appeared. Iran’s aerial assault has already distracted from Israel’s faltering war against Hamas, and reaffirmed Israel’s ties with Western and Arab allies who had become increasingly critical of Israel’s conduct in Gaza.
一些分析人士认为，以色列在大马士革袭击上的误判，可能并非一开始看上去的那样严重。以色列对哈马斯的战争处于困境，伊朗的袭击已经分散了人们对这种不利局面的注意力，令以色列与西方和阿拉伯盟友得以再次确认关系，这些盟友对以色列在加沙的行为越来越不满。

The fact that Iran gave Israel so long to prepare for the attack could indicate that Tehran remains relatively deterred, seeking to create only the optics of a major response while trying to avoid a significant escalation, said Michael Koplow, an Israel analyst at the Israel Policy Forum, a research group based in New York.
纽约研究机构以色列政策论坛的以色列问题分析师迈克尔·科普罗说，伊朗给以色列这么长的时间，来为袭击做准备，这可能表明，德黑兰仍然受到了相对的威慑，它在努力避免事态大幅升级的同时，只在表面上做出重大反应。

“To me, the jury is out,” Mr. Koplow said.
“对我来说，还没有定论，”科普罗说。

“The question is whether this was intended to be something that would actually damage Israel, or if this was supposed to be something that made it seem as though they were responding in strength, but actually signaled that they weren’t,” Mr. Koplow added.
“问题是，他们的意图是要给以色列造成实际损害，还是要让人觉得他们在做出有力回应，然而实际上，这暴露出他们并没有做出有力回应，”科普罗还说。

But for others, it was already clear. Aaron David Miller, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington-based research group, said that Israel had now made two major strategic errors in less than a year: Before Oct. 7, Israeli officials had publicly — and wrongly — concluded that Hamas had been deterred from attacking Israel.
但对另一些人来说，事态已经很清楚了。华盛顿卡内基国际和平基金会的分析师亚伦·戴维·米勒说，以色列在不到一年的时间里犯了两个重大战略错误：在10月7日之前，以色列官员曾公开——而且错误地——得出结论，认为哈马斯已经不敢攻击以色列。

Then Hamas launched the deadliest attack in Israel’s history.
然后哈马斯发动了以色列历史上最致命的袭击。

“When it comes to conceptions, Israel is batting 0 for 2,” said Mr. Miller. “They failed to read Hamas’s capacity and motivation correctly on Oct. 7 and they clearly misjudged how Iran would respond to the April 1 hit.”
“观感上讲，以色列已经失败了两次，”米勒说。“他们在10月7日未能正确解读哈马斯的能力和动机，而且他们显然误判了伊朗对4月1日袭击的反应。”

Gabby Sobelman对本文有报道贡献。

Patrick Kingsley是时报耶路撒冷分社社长，领导对以色列、加沙和约旦河西岸地区的报道。

翻译：纽约时报中文网