When Iran agreed to a deal in 2015 that would require it to surrender 97 percent of the uranium it could use to make nuclear bombs, Russia and China worked alongside the United States and Europe to get the pact done.
2015年，伊朗同意了一项协议，该协议要求伊朗交出97%可用于制造核弹的铀。当时，俄罗斯和中国与美国和欧洲一起努力促成了该协议的达成。
The Russians even took Iran’s nuclear fuel, for a hefty fee, prompting celebratory declarations that President Vladimir V. Putin could cooperate with the West on critical security issues and help constrain a disruptive regime in a volatile region.
俄罗斯人甚至接手了伊朗的核燃料——交了一大笔费用，这令一些人欢欣鼓舞地宣告：普京总统可以在关键的安全问题上与西方合作，帮助在一个动荡地区遏制破坏性政权。
A lot has changed in the subsequent nine years. China and Russia are now more aligned with Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” to an American-led order, along with the likes of North Korea. When President Biden gathered the leaders of six nations for a video call from the White House on Sunday to plot a common strategy for de-escalating the crisis between Israel and Iran, there was no chance of getting anyone from Beijing or Moscow on the screen.
接下来的九年里发生了很多变化。现在，中国和俄罗斯更倾向于支持伊朗的“抵抗轴心”，反对美国主导的秩序，朝鲜也是如此。周日，拜登总统在白宫召集六国领导人进行视频通话，策划一项缓解以色列和伊朗之间危机的共同战略时，根本没指望能有北京或莫斯科方面的人出现在屏幕上。
The disappearance of that unified front is one of the many factors that make this moment seem “particularly dangerous,” said Vali Nasr, an Iranian-born professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “maybe the most dangerous in decades.”
约翰·霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院的伊朗裔教授瓦利·纳斯尔说，统一战线的消失是让这个时刻看起来“特别危险”的诸多因素之一，“可能是几十年来最危险的时刻。”
But it is hardly the only one.
但这并不是唯一的危险时刻。
President Donald J. Trump’s decision to pull out of the Obama-era nuclear deal triggered a predictable counterreaction from Tehran, and after a long pause, Iran resumed enriching uranium — some to near-bomb-grade quality. Today it is far closer to being able to produce bomb-grade material, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, than it was when the accord was in effect. Iran has consistently denied that it intends to build a weapon but has recently begun hinting at the need to bolster its “deterrent” against nuclear-armed adversaries.
特朗普总统退出奥巴马时代核协议的决定不出意料地引发了德黑兰的反应。经过长时间的停顿之后，伊朗恢复了铀浓缩，其中一些达到了接近炸弹级别的质量。根据国际原子能机构的数据，与核协议生效时相比，如今的伊朗已经更接近生产炸弹级材料。伊朗一直否认有意制造核武器，但最近开始暗示，有必要加强对拥有核武器对手的“威慑”。
Tehran has surged ahead with its ballistic missile program, and several months before some of those weapons were unleashed on Israel this weekend, all the remaining United Nations prohibitions expired. Iran has not only emerged as Russia’s most dependable foreign supplier of military drones, but it has also improved its own drone fleet by drawing lessons from their use in Russia’s assault on Ukraine.
德黑兰在弹道导弹项目上突飞猛进，此外在本周末向以色列发射部分导弹的几个月前，联合国所有剩余禁令都已到期。伊朗不仅已成为俄罗斯最可靠的军用无人机外国供应商，而且还从俄罗斯攻击乌克兰时使用无人机的行动中吸取教训，改进了自己的无人机力量。
President Barack Obama’s pursuit of the 2015 nuclear deal was assailed by many Republicans as dangerously irresponsible at the time. Even some Democrats, though supportive of the details of the deal, worried that Mr. Obama was naïve to hope it would bring about fundamental change in Tehran.
奥巴马总统寻求达成2015年核协议，在当时被许多共和党人抨击为不负责任的危险行为。一些民主党人虽然支持协议的细节，但也担心奥巴马希望它能给德黑兰带来根本改变的想法过于天真。
With the latest escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel, Mr. Biden’s political opponents are now blaming the administration for having not taken a tougher line in recent years against Iran. They say that has left Israel in particular peril at a moment when it is mired in a war against an Iranian client group, Hamas, in Gaza.
随着伊朗和以色列之间的紧张局势最近升级，拜登的政治对手现在指责政府近年来没有对伊朗采取更强硬的立场。他们说，这让正在加沙苦战伊朗代理人哈马斯的以色列处于格外危险的境地。
“The White House signaled both obliviousness and weakness by not recognizing that today’s Middle East conflict is not Palestinians or Arabs against Israel, but an Iranian war against ‘the little Satan,’” John R. Bolton, who served as national security adviser to Mr. Trump and was a sharp opponent of the Iran deal, wrote on Sunday.
“白宫没有认识到，今天的中东冲突不是巴勒斯坦人或阿拉伯人对以色列的战争，而是伊朗对‘小撒旦’（伊朗称美国是大撒旦，以色列是它旗下的小撒旦。——译注）的战争，这既表明了白宫的无知，也表明了白宫的软弱，”曾担任特朗普国家安全顾问、强烈反对伊朗核协议的约翰·博尔顿周日写道。
“The sad truth is that Israeli and U.S. deterrence against Iran failed,” he said. He went on to urge — as he and a small group of Iran hawks have before — that the Israelis seize the moment to “destroy Iran’s air defenses” and perhaps go after the Quds Force, Iran’s most elite units. In other words, take a course of escalation exactly the opposite of what Mr. Biden is urging.
“可悲的事实是，以色列和美国对伊朗的威慑失败了，”他写道。他还像以前和一小群对伊政策鹰派那样，敦促以色列抓住时机，“摧毁伊朗的防空系统，”或许还可以打击伊朗最精锐的部队圣城军。换言之，采取与拜登的敦促完全相反的升级路线。
Even among experts more supportive of Mr. Biden’s diplomacy in the region, many are concerned that now there are few levers to influence Iran, especially if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel responds to the attack with a more calibrated retaliatory strike than the one Mr. Bolton is urging.
即使是较支持拜登在该地区外交的专家中，也有很多人担心现在几乎没有什么手段可以影响伊朗，尤其是如果以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡没有采取博尔顿建议的回应方式，而是发起了一场较为谨慎的打击。
“We appear to be headed to an eventual Israel-Iran confrontation,” Mr. Nasr said.
“我们似乎最终会走向以色列和伊朗的对抗，”纳斯尔说。
“Iran and Israel are now the main protagonists in the Middle East,” he added. “They view each other as their most serious national security threats. There are no red lines or rules in place to contain their rivalry. The shadow war is now breaking into the open, and without some rules, they are on an escalatory path."
“伊朗和以色列现在是中东的主角，”他还说。“他们视对方为最严重的国家安全威胁。没有红线或规则来遏制他们之间的竞争。影子战争现在已经公开化，如果没有一些规则约束，就会升级。”
This was not the world Mr. Biden hoped for as he designed a strategy for his administration that focused on containing Russia’s disruptions in Ukraine and beyond, and competing vigorously with China. And in the first three years of Mr. Biden’s presidency, the Middle East seemed relatively calm, until the Oct. 7 terror attack by Hamas killed 1,200 Israelis, upended his priorities and plunged the White House back into a familiar cauldron.
这不是拜登所希望的世界，因为他为其政府设计的战略重点是遏制俄罗斯在乌克兰及其他地区的干扰，并与中国展开激烈竞争。在拜登担任总统的头三年里，中东似乎相对平静，直到10月7日哈马斯发动的恐怖袭击导致1200名以色列人丧生，颠覆了他对轻重缓急的安排，让白宫重新陷入熟悉的困境。
While Mr. Biden used intermediaries to help assure that Iran’s retaliatory strikes over the weekend did not spin out of control — and Iran appeared intent on keeping indirect lines open — there is no direct communication between Washington and Tehran, a major change from even a decade ago.
虽然拜登利用中间人来帮助确保伊朗周末的报复性袭击不会失控，而且伊朗似乎也有意保持间接线路的畅通，但华盛顿和德黑兰之间没有直接沟通，这与十年前相比也是一个重大变化。
For now, Mr. Biden is doing everything he can to persuade Mr. Netanyahu, with whom his relationship is fraught, to “take the win,” as he put it to him Saturday night, and not retaliate.
目前，拜登正在尽一切努力说服内塔尼亚胡——两人之间的关系也颇为令人担忧——“接受胜利”，就像他周六晚上对内塔尼亚胡说的那样，不要报复。
For their part, the Iranians have signaled that in their mind, the incident is over. They have avenged the deaths from an Israeli strike of seven commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. But “over” could simply refer to an end to the missile barrage, not other forms of escalation.
伊朗则表示，在他们看来，事件已经结束。他们已经为在以色列袭击中丧生的七名伊斯兰革命卫队指挥官报仇。但“结束”可能只是指导弹攻击的结束，而不是停止进行其他形式的升级。
The best scenario would be that Iran recognizes the danger as well, as it did on Saturday when it carefully telegraphed its intentions, which made it far easier for the Israelis, the Americans and nearby Arab forces to intercept the incoming drones and missiles. That was a sign that Iran wanted to make a point, but may not be ready to go to the brink of war.
最好的情况是，伊朗也认识到了危险，就像上周六那样，它小心翼翼地表达了自己的意图，这让以色列、美国和附近的阿拉伯军队更容易拦截来袭的无人机和导弹。从中可以看出伊朗是想立威，但可能还没有准备好走向战争边缘。
David E. Sanger负责报道拜登政府和国家安全。他在时报任职超过40年，著有数本关于美国国家安全挑战的书。
翻译：纽约时报中文网
